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ASTRUE V. RATLIFF AND THE DEATH OF
STRONG PURPOSIVISM
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†

According to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court is presently embroiled in an interpretive conflict between textualists, on the one
hand, who believe that “the Constitution, properly understood, requires judges to treat the clear import of an enacted text as conclusive, even when the text fits poorly with its apparent background pur1
2
poses,” and purposivists (or more precisely, “strong purposivists” ),
on the other, who believe that “the ‘letter’ (text) of a statute must
3
yield to its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflict[].” This apparent
philosophical divide has led one scholar to remark that “textualism
has never taken hold as the Court’s single, controlling interpretive
4
method,” and further, that “interpretive consensus” among the Jus5
tices “seem[s] impossible.”
6
At first glance, Astrue v. Ratliff, a case decided last Term, would
seem to confirm the intractability of the conflict. Presented once
again with a question of statutory interpretation, the Court rested its
decision in Ratliff on the plain meaning of the statutory text, as reflected in dictionaries defining a key term and precedent regarding
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similarly worded provisions in other statutes. Writing separately, a
minority of the Justices insisted that Congress likely never intended
8
the result the Court reached, and feared that the “practical effect” of
the Court’s decision would be to “severely undermine[] the [statute’s]
9
estimable aim.”
But Ratliff was not just another battle in an ongoing methodological war. What is striking about the case is that the Justices who wrote
separately nevertheless joined the Court’s opinion in full; indeed, they
accepted the Court’s textual analysis as dispositive, despite acknowledging that congressional intent and statutory purpose pointed the
10
other way. Far from confirming the conventional wisdom, Ratliff demonstrates that meaningful, interpretive consensus does exist on the Supreme Court. At long last, textualism’s central tenet—that a clear text
must be enforced—has prevailed.
I. THE JUSTICES’ OPINIONS IN RATLIFF
At issue in Ratliff was section 204(d)(1)(A) of the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA), which provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justi11
fied.” Ruby Willows Kills Ree had obtained an award of attorney’s
fees under subsection (d)(1)(A) after prevailing in an action for So12
cial Security benefits against the United States. Rather than pay the
fees award, however, the United States sought to use it to offset a
13
preexisting debt Ree owed the federal government. Ree’s attorney,
Catherine Ratliff, challenged the offset, arguing that fees awarded under
EAJA belong to the litigant’s attorney, not the litigant, and thus could not
14
be so used.
The Supreme Court rejected Ratliff’s challenge. Justice Thomas’s
opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court focused on the text of EAJA.
The Court began by noting that it had “long held,” in the context of
other fee-shifting statutes, that the term “prevailing party” refers to the
7
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15

prevailing litigant. It then pointed to other provisions of EAJA that
“clearly distinguish the party who receives the fees award (the litigant)
16
from the attorney who performed the work that generated the fees.”
The Court reasoned that these other provisions “underscore that the
term ‘prevailing party’ in subsection (d)(1)(A) carries its usual and
17
settled meaning—prevailing litigant.” The Court turned finally to
subsection (d)(1)(A)’s use of the verb “award.” Citing the verb’s dictionary definition, the Court concluded that “[t]he plain meaning of
the word ‘award’ in subsection (d)(1)(A) is . . . that the court shall
‘give or assign by . . . judicial determination’ to the ‘prevailing party’
(here, Ratliff’s client Ree) attorney’s fees in the amount sought and
18
substantiated under [the statute].”
The Court thus held that an
award of fees under subsection (d)(1)(A) “is payable to the litigant
and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing
19
debt that the litigant owes the United States.”
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
Justice Sotomayor doubted that Congress had even considered the
question whether the government should be able to use EAJA fee
awards to offset a litigant’s preexisting debt, and found it likely that if
Congress had done so, “it would not have wanted [them] to be subject
20
to offset.” Indeed, she argued, “[s]ubjecting EAJA fee awards to administrative offset for a litigant’s debts will unquestionably make it
more difficult for persons of limited means to find attorneys to
21
represent them,” thereby “undercut[ting]” EAJA’s “admirable pur22
pose.” Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court’s textual analysis, which she acknowledged “compel[led] the conclusion
that an attorney’s fee award under [EAJA] is payable to the prevailing
23
litigant rather than the attorney.” She thus joined the Court’s opi15
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nion, while urging Congress “to clarify beyond debate” whether the
24
“practical effect” of the Court’s decision is “one it actually intends.”
II. RATLIFF’S SIGNIFICANCE
That Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor agreed to give effect to the clear import of EAJA’s text—while acknowledging that
both congressional intent and statutory purpose pointed in a different
direction—is significant for three reasons. First, it suggests agreement
among the Justices about the goal of statutory interpretation. Though
discerning the “intent of the legislature” has traditionally been un25
derstood to be the general goal, the particular kind of “intent”
courts should look for has been the subject of some debate. According to one line of thought, courts should look for the legislature’s subjective intent—that is, what the legislature actually thought about an
issue, or if the issue was not considered, what the legislature would
26
have thought about it. According to another line of thought, associated with textualist theory, courts should look instead for what Justice Scalia calls “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside
27
the remainder of the corpus juris.” In her concurrence in Ratliff, Juscussion of those precedents formed the starting point of its textual analysis, which presumed that the term “prevailing party” should be interpreted consistently throughout
the U.S. Code. See id. at 2525 (majority opinion).
24
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25
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omitted)); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907)
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law-maker meant by assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and
endeavoring to gather from the mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he
sought to meet them, his intention with respect to the particular point in controversy”). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222-28 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the
“specific intent” and “imaginative reconstruction” strains of intentionalist theory).
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tice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s holding was contrary to the result Congress would have intended if it had actually considered the
28
issue of offsets. But her recognition that the Court’s holding was
nevertheless compelled by EAJA’s text implies that the object of statutory interpretation is, in the end, not the legislature’s subjective intent, but its objectified intent, as textualists have long maintained.
Second, the opinions in Ratliff indicate that the Justices agree that
the various sources of statutory meaning should be considered in a
hierarchical manner, as opposed to a holistic one. According to Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, courts interpret statutes
by considering each source of statutory meaning (such as text, legisla29
tive history, purpose, and societal values) in light of all the others.
Eskridge and Frickey compare the process to a “hermeneutical circle,”
where “[a] part can only be understood in the context of the whole,
and the whole cannot be understood without analyzing its various
30
parts.” Neither of the opinions in Ratliff, however, seemed to follow
such a holistic model. Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court proceeded beyond the text of the statute only to address Ratliff’s counte31
rarguments. And Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence—though it discussed other interpretive sources such as subjective legislative intent
and statutory purpose—viewed them each in isolation, separate from
32
the text itself. The opinions in Ratliff thus suggest a strict hierarchy
of sources, whereby each is exhausted one at a time, rather than eva33
luated in relation to all the others.
Finally, and most importantly, Ratliff signals consensus about what
lies at the top of the interpretive hierarchy. For Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the case presented a rare opportunity to
answer what is perhaps the most fundamental question of statutory interpretation: When the text of a statute conflicts with its purpose,
which should prevail? Textualism has long been defined by the an34
swer that the text should take precedence. Purposivism, as reflected
28
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in cases such as Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, has long
been associated with the view that the purpose should prevail. In Ratliff, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor sided definitively with
textualism. As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence forthrightly explained, the purpose of EAJA cut clearly in Ratliff’s favor, but the text
36
of the statute compelled the Court to rule against her. So much for
Holy Trinity and the notion that “a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
37
nor within the intention of its makers.” Unwilling to ignore EAJA’s
text to advance its clear purpose, the concurring Justices joined the
rest of the Court in placing the statutory text at the top of the interpretive hierarchy.
What about Justice Breyer, arguably the Court’s leading purposivist, who signed the Court’s opinion but not Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence? What accounts for his vote? One explanation may be that
he was content to join the Court’s opinion because he thought the sta38
tute’s text accurately expressed its purpose. But that would have required him to disregard the strong evidence that EAJA’s text and pur39
pose in fact conflicted. The more likely explanation is that Justice
Breyer is a purposivist in only the “weak” sense of the term—an interpreter who is willing to rely on purpose “to clarify an ambiguous text,”
40
but who is unwilling to use it “to depart from a clear” one. His own
writings suggest as much. The discussion of statutory interpretation in
his book Active Liberty focuses on the “interpretive problem [that] arises when statutory language does not clearly answer the question of
41
what the statute means or how it applies.” In “difficult cases of interpretation in which language is not clear,” Justice Breyer argues,
42
“judges should pay primary attention to a statute’s purpose.” The
implication is that when the statutory language does give a clear an-
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35
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swer, consulting such purpose is unnecessary. If this account of Justice Breyer’s approach is correct, then his vote in Ratliff is easy to explain. For him, as for all the other Justices, statutory text ranks at the
top of the interpretive hierarchy and must be enforced when it is clear.
CONCLUSION
Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible. It
is real. If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead; there is
agreement now that a clear text must be given effect. This is not to say
that interpretive differences no longer remain, for there will still be disputes over whether a text is clear and what to do if it is ambiguous. But
44
at least for now, a key battle is over: In the fight for the top spot in the
Court’s interpretive hierarchy, the text can declare victory.
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